Public Disclosure of Physician Information: Who Knows What\u27s Best for Whom? by Fellmeth, R. C. & D\u27Angelo, J. B.
COMMENTARY 
Public Disclosure of Physician Information: 
Who Knows What's Best for Whom? 
By Robert C. Fellmeth and Julianne B. D'Angelo 
The "public disclosure policy" of the Medical Board of California (MBC) has always borne a misnomer. It has 
traditionally been MBC's policy to dis-
close nothing about its licensees to inquir-
ing consumers except its own disciplinary 
actions, which have been few and far be-
tween in comparison to the number of 
complaints and reports about physician 
misconduct which merit attention. This 
policy has resulted in the dissemination of 
misleading information to patients-the 
very constituency whose protection is the 
Board's raison d'etre. For example, we 
know of a physician in San Diego who has 
been sued for medical malpractice six 
times in the past ten years, suffered a 
$50,000 malpractice settlement in I 983 
and another in excess of $ I million in 
1989, and has had his privileges revoked 
by three hospitals in the San Diego area in 
the past ten years. Last spring, we called 
the Medical Board to check on his record. 
We were given his California license num-
ber and told he has "no disciplinary ac-
tions against him-his record is clean." 
This example illustrates two problems 
with the Medical Board's discipline sys-
tem: the facts that (I) he has no disciplin-
ary record, and (2) the Medical Board-a 
public agency-won't tell consumers any 
of this very relevant information (most of 
which is public infonnation) about serious 
misconduct directly related to patient care 
and this person's competence to practice 
medicine. 
For five years, we have focused sig-
nificant time and energy on pressuring 
the Board and the legislature to enhance 
and strengthen MBC's disciplinary per-
formance. Until that performance sub-
stantially improves, however, public dis-
closure of information about physicians 
by the Medical Board remains a critical 
component of the public protection func-
tion with which MBC is charged. 
THE MEDICAL BOARD'S 
"PuBLIC DISCLOSURE POLICY" 
Let's review the Medical Board's tra-
ditional public disclosure policy: 
• MBC Investigations. With regard to 
complaints made to the Medical Board, 
the Board has not disclosed any infor-
mation to an inquiring member of the 
public until they have been fully inves-
tigated and formal charges are filed by 
the Attorney General's Office. Let's as-
sume that the Medical Board is complet-
ing most investigations within an aver-
age of six months, as is contemplated 
under Business and Professions Code 
section 23 19. We know that it then takes 
the AG's Office over one year to prepare 
an accusation in any given case, because 
it is understaffed and severely back-
logged. That's a minimum of eighteen 
months, during which the physician is 
usually free to practice. And during 
twelve of those eighteen months, a com-
pleted investigation which apparently 
warrants disciplinary action is sitting at 
the AG's Office awaiting processing. 
Yet, during those eighteen months, a 
consumer who has the initiative to tele-
phone the Medical Board to inquire 
about her physician will be told nothing. 
That is affirmatively misleading and 
leaves the consumer with a false sense 
of confidence in the physician. 
• Other Misconduct. With regard to 
other known physician misconduct or neg-
ligence, the Board's traditional policy has 
been to conceal the following information: 
criminal charges and convictions, medical 
malpractice settlements and judgments, 
and discipline by other state medical 
boards-all of which is public infonnation. 
This means that a physician could have 
three malpractice judgments each in excess 
of $ I million, three malpractice settlements 
each in excess of $1 million, three felony 
convictions directly related to patient care, 
three misdemeanor driving-under-the-in-
fluence convictions, and discipline by three 
other states, but the Medical Board-the 
public agency charged with protecting pa-
tients from incompetent, impaired, and dis-
honest physicians and which knows all of 
this-will never disclose any of this infor-
mation. 
• Adverse Peer Review Actions. Fi-
nally, with regard to one of the most rel-
evant pieces of information a consumer 
could receive-the fact that a physician's 
hospital privileges have been revoked, 
suspended, or denied by a committee of 
his or her peers at a hospital or other 
health facility, section 805 of the Busi-
ness and Professions Code prohibits the 
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Board from disclosing this information 
to an inquiring consumer. 
THE BOARD MOVES 
IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION 
Last spring, at a wide-ranging "Medi-
cal Summit" called by the Medical Board 
and the Department of Consumer Affairs, 
we urged the Board to change its public 
disclosure policy in all three of these areas. 
Staggering to recover at least some of its 
integrity after the January 1993 release of 
a harshly critical audit of its enforcement 
program, the Board finally agreed with 
some of these public disclosure sugges-
tions at its May 1993 meeting. 
• MBC Investigations. With regard to 
MBC disciplinary proceedings, we 
called on MBC to disclose completed in-
vestigations to an inquiring consumer at 
the time the Board turns the case over 
to the AG's Office. By moving disclo-
sure up to the point at which the com-
pleted investigation is referred to the 
AG's Office for accusation drafting, the 
Board would enable inquiring consumers 
to learn about very serious and fully inves-
tigated misconduct about one year earlier 
than they presently can. According to the 
AG's Office, an accusation is filed in 95-
99% of the cases referred by the Medical 
Board, and formal discipline results in a 
vast majority of those. Thus, there is little 
or no reason to fear that the information 
being disclosed will turn out to be errone-
ous; however, a disclaimer that "no official 
findings have been made" could accom-
pany the disclosure. 
MBC agreed to this change, reason-
ing that it could feel comfortable about 
releasing the results of an investigation 
that its own investigators have com-
pleted, that such a matter is no longer 
"under investigation" and that, at the 
very least, there is probable cause to be-
lieve that the accused physician has com-
mitted a disciplinable offense. The Board 
agreed that consumers should be in-
formed that it has done its job. 
• Other Misconduct. We also urged 
the Board to disclose to inquiring con-
sumers other pieces of public informa-
tion that the Board collects about physi-
cian misconduct and negligence. Cur-
rently, the Board routinely receives in-
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formation on felony charges against phy-
sicians, criminal convictions against 
physicians, medical malpractice judg-
ments and settlements in excess of 
$30,000, and reports of professional dis-
cipline by other states. All of this infor-
mation is public information. Consum-
ers could get most of it at a county court-
house, but they shouldn't have to. Pa-
tients rightly believe that the Medical 
Board is the primary repository of infor-
mation about physicians licensed in Cal-
ifornia, and that its job is to protect con-
sumers from physicians who don't mea-
sure up to standards. 
After much debate, the Board voted 
to change this policy in three respects. 
MBC decided to disclose information 
about discipline in other states, felony 
convictions, and medical malpractice 
judgments in excess of $30,000. How-
ever, it reserved the right to identify and 
conceal certain categories of these disci-
plinary actions, felony convictions, and 
malpractice judgments which might be 
"unrelated" to competence in the prac-
tice of medicine. The Board also agreed 
to accompany the disclosure of this in-
formation with disclaimer statements 
noting, for example, that these decisions 
were not made by the Board and that 
they may not necessarily be dispositive 
on the issue of incompetence. 
• Adverse Peer Review Actions. We 
also argued that the Board should spon-
sor legislation authorizing it to disclose 
certain "section 805 reports" of adverse 
peer review actions against physicians. 
Every year, approximately 200 Califor-
nia physicians suffer an adverse peer re-
view action-that is, their hospital ad-
mitting privileges are revoked or re-
stricted by a private panel of their phy-
sician peers because of incompetence or 
serious misconduct. These actions are 
not taken often or lightly, and-under 
federal law and judicial decision-must 
be accompanied by full procedural due 
process for the accused physician. This 
means the physician is legally entitled to 
written notice of the charges, an oppor-
tunity to be represented by legal counsel, 
an ability to confront and cross-examine 
witnesses at a hearing, the right to put 
on a defense, a written decision, and re-
view by a court. 
As you might imagine, doctors do not 
routinely kick colleague doctors out of 
hospitals. Among other things, their fear 
of civil liability for antitrust violations 
inhibits peer review action in all but the 
most egregious cases. The Medical Board 
recently compiled a summary of 65 ad-
verse peer review actions taken during a 
six-month period. The reasons cited in-
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elude the following: "failed to diagnose 
and treat, resulting in patient's demise," 
"multiple unnecessary procedures per-
formed," "subject's continued exercise 
of privileges would present an imminent 
danger to the health and welfare of hos-
pital patients," "subject diverted drugs," 
"examined and treated patients while 
under the influence of alcohol." 
So, through the peer review process, 
individual hospitals and the physicians 
who run them can protect themselves 
from financial liability due to the incom-
petence of other physicians. Do we pa-
tients have access to this information, so 
we can protect our bodies and our lives 
from the same group? Absolutely not. 
The information is strictly confidential. 
While section 805 of the Business and 
Professions Code requires health facili-
ties to report adverse peer review actions 
to the Medical Board (thus the name 
"section 805 reports"), it also prohibits 
the Medical Board from revealing that 
information to an inquiring consumer. 
Thus, we argued that consumers should 
be told of adverse peer review actions 
where the cause of the private discipline is 
medical in nature and is directly relevant 
to patient care. On a 9-4 vote, the Board 
agreed to seek statutory authority to dis-
close "certain final actions by health care 
facilities or other bodies falling under the 
provisions of section 805 of the Business 
and Professions Code involving involun-
tary limitation or termination of clinical 
privileges, when those actions are based on 
issues of medical competence which in the 
judgment of the Board may compromise 
the deli very of patient care or patient 
safety." Again, MBC agreed that this in-
formation should be accompanied with a 
disclaimer noting that the decision was not 
made by the Board. 
THREE STEPS FORWARD, 
Two STEPS BACK 
Because the Board's prior public dis-
closure policy was so stegosaurean, 1 
these decisions were deemed "historic" 
and "unprecedented" by the press. In-
deed, we supported the Board's moves 
as in the right direction. But we see these 
changes as minor, long-overdue correc-
tions to an offensive policy, and merely 
the first steps in the long journey toward 
fulfillment of the Board's statutory 
charge. And more decisive and coura-
geous Board action is now required, be-
cause the California Medical Association 
(CMA)-which opposed almost all of 
MBC's public disclosure decisions-has 
taken direct aim at the Board's new pol-
icy and has already succeeded in derail-
ing an important part of it. 
CMA Thwarts the Board on Peer 
Review Disclosure. After the Medical 
Board decided to support the disclosure 
of section 805 reports, Senator Robert 
Presley amended his then-pending SB 
916, a wide-ranging physician discipline 
system reform bill, to include a provision 
requiring MBC to reveal to an inquiring 
consumer the fact that a physician's priv-
ileges have been revoked or restricted by 
a health facility. This provision was sup-
ported by the Wilson administration, 
many consumer groups which have 
fought long and hard to pierce the veil 
of secrecy in the medical profession, and 
the Medical Board. 
Who would oppose such a provision? 
Only CMA, a wealthy trade group rep-
resenting less than one-half the physi-
cians in California. CMA opposed it with 
a vengeance, and CMA talks the monied 
language of Sacramento-politicians do 
not need translators. At CMA's behest, 
nine members of the Senate Business and 
Professions Committee (Senators Dan 
Boatwright, Ruben Ayala, Bill Craven, 
Leroy Greene, Gary Hart, David Kelley, 
Lucy Killea, Milton Marks, and Herschel 
Rosenthal) unanimously stripped SB 916 
of this important provision on June 14, pre-
ferring to protect 200 incompetent physi-
cians per year at the expense of 30 million 
California patients. 
What happens when a physician's hos-
pital privileges are revoked? Not a thing. 
It is absolutely secret, so patients can't 
learn of it. Does the Medical Board revoke 
that physician's license to protect us from 
that doctor? Usually not. In 1991-92, 
health facilities revoked or restricted the 
privileges of 178 physicians in California 
for poor patient care or substance abuse; 
during that same year, the Medical Board 
took action against only 51 licenses for the 
same reasons. Nothing prevents a physi-
cian whose privileges are revoked at one 
hospital from obtaining similar privileges 
at another hospital in the same locality or 
a new residence. 
CMA argues that the Board should 
follow up on peer review actions and 
discipline licenses where appropriate to 
protect consumers. We couldn't agree 
more. But at the same time, CMA has 
opposed needed license fee increases and 
adequate authority for the Board to do 
so. In 1992, it successfully opposed a 
proposal to increase MBC license renew-
al fees by $25 per year (to $275 annu-
ally; attorneys pay $500 per year). In 
1993, CMA grudgingly agreed to a $50 
annual increase (to $300 annually) in-
cluded in SB 916. But CMA also loaded 
the bill with contingencies which would 
cancel that fee increase, one of which 
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has now occurred, wiping out the addi-
tional revenue so desperately needed by 
MBC's enforcement program. At the same 
time, the medical profession's local/state/ 
national trade association conglomerate 
charges well over $1,200 a year in profes-
sional dues for lobbying and campaign 
contributions. While CMA argues that 
(I) peer review should remain secret, (2) 
the Board should act where a physician 
is truly incompetent, and (3) the Board's 
action (not the peer review result) should 
be disclosed to the public, the Board suf-
fers due to CMA's refusal to agree to in-
creased resources. Simultaneously, MBC 
benefits due to the secrecy demanded by 
CMA-the Board can ignore hospital re-
ports with impunity since nobody knows 
about them. 
CMA's orientation, of course, is with 
physicians who in good faith wish to 
protect the profession's standards by po-
licing their own. CMA argues that hos-
pital peer review activity should be pro-
tected and encouraged. If peer review ac-
tions are disclosed, peer review commit-
tees would be inhibited from imposing 
minor, "wake-up call"-type sanctions for 
fear that publicity of any negative judg-
ment at all about a physician would shat-
ter a career. The CMA conclusion: Let 
peer review proceed unfettered, stimulate 
it, and require the Board to follow up 
where warranted. 
In fact, consumer advocates are not 
averse to minor peer review sanctions re-
maining private (e.g., advice to a colleague 
to review an area of deficiency). But we 
are not talking about this type of action. 
We are talking about decisions to limit 
or revoke the right of a physician to 
practice in a facility specifically because 
of his or her incompetence. Those deci-
sions should be available to the public. 
The removal of a physician's hospital 
privileges is a serious matter. In many 
communities, it forces the physician to 
relocate because small towns may have 
only one hospital-usually a necessity in 
the full practice of medicine. It may lead 
a physician to send a patient to an unfa-
miliar facility where he or she still has 
privileges-with the patient not knowing 
why, and perhaps at some peril. The 
point missed by CMA is as follows: Ei-
ther the peer review process is a reliable 
method of judging and assuring compe-
tence for public protection, or it is not. 
If it provides adequate due process and 
involves sufficient objectivity to properly 
result in the deprivation of a practitioner's 
access to a (perhaps the) major medical fa-
cility needed to practice medicine, why is 
it suddenly suspect when it comes to pub-
lic disclosure? How can practitioners say 
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the process is fair when it enables a hos-
pital to remove a bad doctor and the con-
comitant liability exposure for the bene-
fit of the institution, but that same deci-
sion is too ephemeral and unreliable a 
judgment for anyone else to know 
about? 
We concede that a strong argument 
can be made that peer review is not a 
minimally acceptable substitute for the 
state's decision about whether one should 
practice a trade or profession. To be sure, 
we believe that the majority of peer re-
view decisions to revoke privileges are 
both valid and made in good faith. But 
that is not the point. The judges in peer 
review are often colleagues or competi-
tors of the one being judged. Economics 
is frequently involved. Further, the priv-
ileges of many physicians are not acted 
upon because of personal relations, income 
generation, etc. The persons adjudicating 
peer review have little knowledge of ap-
plicable law, virtually none of the rules of 
evidence, and uncertain familiarity with 
decisions made in similar cases by other 
institutions. Although many may be qual-
ified to evaluate the competence of a col-
league, they are not qualified to make the 
final judgment about whether that person 
should practice on behalf of the people of 
the state. That judgment requires the skills 
listed above, and some feeling for other 
decisions being made, so there is a consis-
tency which is an aspirational hallmark of 
any system of justice. 
Reduced to its essentials, peer review 
is either reliable as an indicator of in-
competence or it is not. If it is, its final 
judgment should be made public. If it is 
not, it should not be taking place. In its 
stead, those playing "king for a day" and 
denying access to the "sovereign's for-
ests" should play a useful role as provid-
ers of evidence and expert testimony to 
an agency of the state. Such an agency 
can theoretically provide the indepen-
dence needed to give a decision credibil-
ity and consistency with other similar de-
cisions. And, perhaps as important, it can 
create an effective bar to practice for 
those who would endanger the public. 
Criminal Charges and Convictions. 
As noted above, MBC has agreed to re-
veal felony convictions against physi-
cians. Not misdemeanor convictions. 
And neither felony nor misdemeanor 
charges, both of which are public infor-
mation. Further, the Board believes it 
should continue to suppress information 
about felony convictions which are "un-
related" to physician performance. What? 
Can you think of afelony conviction you 
would not want to know about before en-
trusting your health, life, and money to 
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a physician? We can't. And what about 
serious offenses which are (or could be) 
charged as felonies but are plea-bar-
gained down to misdemeanor convic-
tions? Driving under the influence of al-
cohol or narcotics? Assault and battery? 
Medicare or Medi-Cal fraud? Wouldn't 
you want to know? Wouldn't you want 
to know that the physician who will op-
erate on your daughter next week in Sac-
ramento plead guilty to a misdemeanor 
DUI charge last week in Los Angeles? 
What if it were his third such convic-
tion? Under the Board's new policy, you 
and your daughter won't get that public 
information. 
Malpractice Judgments and Settle-
ments. Under its new policy, MBC in-
tends to reveal medical malpractice judg-
ments in excess of $30,000. Not judg-
ments below $30,000, even though they 
have been rendered after a full civil trial 
complete with all its due process-protec-
tive trappings, and even though the Med-
ical Board has access to them through 
the National Practitioner Data Bank. And 
not malpractice settlements, no matter 
what the amount and no matter how 
many there are. 
Give us a break. This is all public in-
formation-even in cases where court 
files (including settlement amount) have 
been sealed, the fact of a malpractice set-
tlement or judgment is public informa-
tion, and its secretion by the Board 
charged with public protection is offen-
sive to our judicial system. Consistent 
with their fear and loathing of trial law-
yers, judges, and juries, the Board and 
CMA argue that most malpractice cases 
are frivolous and that all malpractice set-
tlements are simply "business decisions 
by insurance companies" which are irrel-
evant to a physician's competence. They 
also note that, in medical malpractice 
cases, one act of simple negligence may 
qualify as a cause of action while that 
same act of simple negligence is insuf-
ficient to justify discipline against the li-
cense of a physician; gross negligence or 
an established pattern of negligence must 
be proven in a physician discipline case. 
Finally, they argue that the burdens of 
proof vary between malpractice cases and 
physician discipline proceedings: In the 
former, the plaintiff's attorney need only 
prove negligence by a preponderance of 
the evidence, while in the latter the Board 
must prove gross negligence or other stat-
utory violation by "clear and convincing 
evidence to a reasonable certainty." 
The short answer to this tiresome ti-
rade is: So what? Malpractice judgment 
and settlement information is public in-




vant to a physician's competence, and 
which is tried or otherwise tested in the 
context of a judicial system in which the 
physician's interests are fully repre-
sented. Should consumers have to pay 
for the fact that the AMA and CMA have 
helped in no small measure to fashion 
the laws which make it easy for a phy-
sician to hide her misconduct and diffi-
cult for the Board to discipline her? And 
won't the Board's new policy (disclose 
judgments but not settlements) simply 
encourage all physicians to settle and 
seal all cases, so malpractice proceedings 
will never see the light of day? While 
this may have a salutary effect on the 
dockets of trial courts and the pocket-
books of trial lawyers (a result no doubt 
unintended by CMA), we consumers will 
never know when our physician has set-
tled one, five, or 25 malpractice cases. 
We agree that physicians in some spe-
cialties and subspecialties are sued for mal-
practice more frequently than are others, 
simply because of the nature of what they 
do. We agree that one or more settlements 
(or even judgments) in some specialties 
over the course of a career may not be par-
ticularly indicative of a physician's com-
petence. And we agree that many malprac-
tice cases are not meritorious. However, 
we also know that only one in about ten 
incidents of physician negligence ever be-
come the subject of a lawsuit.2 And we do 
not agree that the Board should conceal 
from the public all malpractice settle-
ments-whatever the amount paid-and 
all fully litigated judgments of liability 
under $30,000. 
Even in high-risk specialties, it is 
possible to draw a line-in terms of 
number of judgments/settlements per ca-
reer-where statistical probability blurs 
into questionable competence. We be-
lieve the Board has an obligation to de-
termine that line, even if it means spe-
cialty-by-specialty scrutiny, and begin 
both to (I) act in those cases and (2) 
disclose malpractice judgments and set-
tlements where their combination indi-
cates a problematical pattern. For exam-
ple, would you rather know whether 
your anesthesiologist has suffered one 
malpractice judgment of $35,000 over a 
25-year career, or four settlements in ex-
cess of $500,000 in a ten-year career? 
The Board's past performance indicates 
that it is unlikely to take action in either 
case; and even if it decides to take action 
in the latter case, it may take MBC any-
where from three to eleven years to dis-
cipline that physician. Meanwhile, under 
the Board's new policy, you'll find out 
about the former case, and you'll never 
know about the latter. 
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Predictably, CMA patronizingly ar-
gues that all consumers are unsophisti-
cated rubes who will go or not go to a 
physician because of a single malprac-
tice judgment or settlement. Maybe so, 
maybe not. But that problem could be 
ameliorated if the Board, using statistical 
data which it can easily gather through 
its biennial survey of California physi-
cians, determines the point at which a 
pattern of malpractice actions (both 
judgments and settlements) indicates a 
problem, and discloses these actions 
only when that pattern is demonstrated. 
CMA also warns that the Medical 
Board's disclosure of this information 
stamps it with an "imprimatur" of trust-
worthiness. And well it should. The 
Board is merely passing on public infor-
mation which happens to be true and ac-
curate, and may be relevant to a con-
sumer in choosing a physician. Consum-
ers, by the way, pay for the collection of 
this information-both as patients of 
physicians who pass their MBC licens-
ing fees on to us in the form of an indi-
rect tax, and as taxpayers who directly 
support government entities (e.g., district 
attorney's offices) which must act when 
the Board fails to act. The Board and the 
medical profession should drop the pa-
ternalistic approach, disclose public in-
formation to consumers with accurate 
explanatory information, and let the con-
sumer who has paid for the compilation 
of this information make up his or her 
own mind. 
CONCLUSION 
Physicians are trained in a hierarchical 
system of authority. Especially in their re-
spective areas of specialty, they expect 
their judgments to be accepted without 
question. And they coextensively suffer 
from the horizontalization of society-they 
empathize strongly with each other, with 
their occupational "peers." Most genuinely 
believe that only physicians can judge phy-
sicians. Such is the trade and profession 
tribalism of the 1990s. 
What some of them do not understand 
is the nature of the body politic, the basic 
integrity of the state. Physicians are not 
philosopher-kings and we do not live in a 
Platonic society. And physicians are not 
judges. They are not the "parents" of con-
sumers, appropriately presuming not to al-
locate already public information based on 
their collective judgment of our inability 
to maturely understand it or any disclaimer 
explaining it. Let's get real about who they 
are and who the rest of us are. Some of 
these particular licensees know some 
things about some problems with our bod-
ily functions. Period. Some are smart. 
Some are incompetent. Some are danger-
ous. Some are dedicated to their oath. 
Some are greedy. Whatever the percent-
ages, they warrant no deference in the 
exercise of determinative police power 
on behalf of the general populace. They 
certainly should participate in such deci-
sions; their advice and counsel should be 
expected. But what many of them seek 
instead is the general recognition of a 
kind of medieval guild where they de-
cide; end of discussion. And they control 
what we know about that decision. This 
notion of the expert "guild-meister" ad-
vancing human well-being and providing 
beneficent self-regulation has long been re-
jected by the human experience, and has 
been the subject of periodic pillorying by 
the great writers and artists of history, from 
Chaucer to Voltaire to Wagner. 
This nation has instead cast its fate 
with the following and substantially con-
trary legal and egalitarian principles. We 
are a nation guided by laws applying 
equally to all of us; we conduct our gov-
ernmental affairs in public; whether one 
is allowed to practice a trade or profes-
sion is a public decision properly made 
by public institutions. It is certainly al-
luring to replace such a system with a 
private "thumbs up" or "thumbs down" 
made by a secret "club"-that is, it's al-
luring if you're in the club. But America 
has long since arrived at a different ar-
rangement-and almost all of us have 
agreed to it. Almost all of us. 
ENDNOTES 
I . Stegosaurus is the dinosaur with 
large protective armor plates which, when 
threatened, would allegedly respond by 
lowering his head to the ground and turn-
ing his back toward his adversary. 
2. We have also argued that the Board 
should disclose medical malpractice fil-
ings, as these are also public information 
which any consumer could obtain at any 
courthouse. The Board has solved this 
problem by refusing to even gather the 
information. The Board/CMA position is 
that such filings are so irrelevant that the 
Board charged with protecting health 
and safety should not even know about 
them-even if a pattern of thirty to forty 
such filings exists. In fact, about one in 
five such lawsuits results in a judgment 
well beyond nuisance value (over $30,000), 
making these filings a relatively rich 
source of useful information. Only one in 
thirty or forty consumer complaints leads 
to a serious investigation. 
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